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The objective of this paper is to discuss 
macroeconomic policies that would help 
African countries, especially the low 
income countries (LICs), reach strong, 
sustained and shared growth in the post-
crisis world. The paper first reviews, with 
a special focus on LICs, macroeconomic 
policies in Africa prior to the crisis. It 
then discusses factors behind ‘the Africa 
surprise’ that is the continent’s overall 
good performance during the crisis and 
relatively fast recovery. It underscores 
that in the aftermath of the crisis, the 
emphasis of the macroeconomic policy 
needs to shift from the objective of very 
low inflation that predominated prior to 
the crisis towards growth. Fiscal policy is 
key in this regard, through public outlays 
on infrastructure anchored in the 
medium term expenditure frameworks 
that would also have a counter-cyclical 
role. Where conditions allow, frontier 
market LICs may want to consider 
adopting flexible inflation targeting 
frameworks that would provide sufficient 
room for expansion of credit to the 
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I.  Introduction 
 
In the aftermath of the global financial and economic crisis, African policy makers have 
been rethinking their economic strategies for the next decade
1.  Given the large share of 
low-income countries (LICs) on the continent, poverty reduction still tops the policy 
agenda. At the same time, Africa’s high pre-crisis growth and a quick rebound from the 
crisis have highlighted the continent’s vast and so far mostly untapped economic 
potential. The key question then is how to turn Africa’s potential into substantial and 
tangible improvements in people’s living standards.  
 
With Africa rebounding, the consensus has emerged that the key policy challenge ahead 
of African policy makers is to turn the effective responses to the crisis and the ongoing 
recovery into strong, sustained and shared growth over the medium term. Such growth is 
key for building a prosperous Africa. While by itself it is not sufficient to reduce poverty, 
without the increased resources that growth will generate, progress with the other non-
income poverty development goals will be also jeopardized. And only growth that is 
shared – through creating decent jobs and social safety nets – can be sustained through 
steady and wide popular support for reforms. 
 
The objective of this paper is to provide an overview of macroeconomic policies prior to 
the crisis and responses in Africa, with a focus on LICs, and discuss policy options in the 
aftermath of the crisis. The paper is organized as follows. After this Introduction, Section 
II takes a rearview mirror looking at Africa’s macroeconomic policies and performance 
during 2001-08. Section III covers Africa’s overall surprising resilience during the crisis 
and discusses exit strategies from crisis interventions. Section IV outlines policies that 
would refocus the agenda from stabilization and very low inflation to strong, sustained 
and shared growth in the decade ahead. Section V concludes.   
 
II.  Africa’s growth in the rearview mirror (2001-08) 
 
1.  Growth and inflation outcomes 
 
At an average of 5.7 percent a year during 2001-08, Africa experienced its highest growth 
in decades. A combination of factors contributed to this strong performance. In addition 
to a favorable external environment, domestic factors such as reduced conflict, greater 
political stability, and prudent macroeconomic policies underpinned growth. A number of 
African LICs undertook structural reforms that improved the business environment (e.g., 
Rwanda, Ethiopia), the financial sector (Nigeria), administration, and governance (Sierra 
Leone). Moreover, increasing trade and investment flows between Africa and China, 
India and the Gulf countries are becoming an important driver of growth and a buffer 
against shocks. 
 
The high growth was wide-spread across the continent, with about 40 percent of countries 
having grown above average of 5 percent a year. Both middle-income countries (MICs) 
                                                 
1See Devarajan and Kasekende (2009).   6
and low-income countries (LICs) grew at almost the same rates during this period. 
Nevertheless, differences in rates persisted across subgroups such as the oil exporters and 
the oil importers as well as between fragile LICs, frontier market LICs, transition LICs 
and the rest (Figure 1 and Table AI.1 in Annex I). Oil exporters, frontier market LICs and 
transition LICs grew faster than the others, reflecting both the favorable external 
environment and domestic reform efforts.
2 
 




Source: Authors’ calculations based on the African Economic Outlook database. 1/ EMEs denotes 
emerging market economies and FMs denotes frontier markets. 
 
Africa’s relatively high growth during 2001-08 was a positive turnaround, but it was still 
not high enough to initiate convergence to the living standards in advanced economies. 
Only about 25 percent of low-income countries (LICs) grew at 7 or more percent a year 
during this period. On the inflation side, about 40 percent of the LICs had inflation below 
5 percent and 75 percent of them below 10 percent during 2001 – 08 (Figures AI.1.a and 
AI.1.b, Annex I)
3. The overall reduction in inflation is a marked improvement from the 
1990s when less than half of LICs had inflation below 10 percent. Most countries, 
ranging from frontier markets to fragile states, were able to establish a lower and more 
stable inflationary environment (Figure AI.2., Annex I).  However, the high growth 
needed to improve people’s lives has remained elusive for most African LICs. 
                                                 
2 This grouping of countries is based on income per capita, recent growth and medium-term growth 
prospects and the level of financial sector development. In that context, emerging market economies are for 
the most part middle income countries that have also accessed international capital markets and/or attracted 
the interest of foreign investors. Frontier markets exhibited substantial pre-crisis growth and resilience 
during the crisis, and also already have or are just about to access the international capital markets. 
 
3 Some countries recorded reductions in inflation rates from mid-double digits in the 1990s to low-single 
digits in the 2000s (e.g. Guinea Bissau) or further consolidated their stabilization gains by moving from 
high to low single digit inflation rates in 2000s (e.g., Cape Verde, Republic of Congo).   7
Yet, in most cases, very low inflation rates (below 5 percent) are not appropriate inflation 
targets for LICs. While benefits to growth of bringing down high inflation are well 
documented, empirical evidence shows that for LICs inflation hampers growth only if it 
exceeds a certain threshold (typically 10-20 percent); the positive impact of reduced 
inflation on growth is insignificant below this threshold. Moreover, LICs that target very 
low inflation (say below 5 percent) can experience unintended contractionary effects in 
the event of shocks
4.  At the same time, once inflation is stabilized at low level and 
expectations adjust, faster growth may be achieved without raising inflation. Put 
differently, LICs should not aim at very low inflation levels, with the threshold for ‘very 
low’ being often set at 5 percent or higher (IMF, 2005).  
 
In sum, at least some of the LICs that achieved very low inflation rates may have done so 
at some cost in terms of their growth. Going forward in the aftermath of the crisis, 




2.  Constraints to growth 
   
Despite the strong performance observed prior to the crisis, African countries still face 
key constraints to medium and long-term growth that need to be addressed through 
appropriate policy interventions. Africa has been characterized by relatively low savings 
rates, especially in comparison to developing Asia (Figure 2a and Table AI.2, Annex). 
Once again, the aggregate numbers hide important differences across countries and 
groups such as North and sub-Saharan Africa.  While savings rates in North African 
countries increased rapidly during the pre-crisis commodity boom and as a result of 
financial sector development
6, they continued to be low in most SSA countries.  
 
From another perspective, low savings are oil importers’ Achilles heel. As many of the 
oil importing countries were unable to access international capital markets and did not 
attract much FDI, their investment rates were also low and relied on official aid. Long-
standing factors such as low per capita income, low financial depth, high young-age 
dependency ratios, and aid dependency have contributed to low savings rates of this 
group, reinforced at times by conditions contributing to capital flight (e.g., weak 
investment climate).  
 
                                                 
4 Nigeria is a good example in this regard. With current (August 2010) inflation above 10 percent, the 
Central Bank aims at reducing it to 9.5 percent but not lower, stating that growth is the key priority. 
 
5 Collier (2007) pointed out that it was not clear to what extent the latest boom in the region was driven by 
improved commodity prices. However, some of the fastest growing countries (Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania) 
are resource poor and introduced important structural reforms prior to the crisis, in addition to improved 
macroeconomic management. 
 
6 In these countries, saving and investment rates were below those in Asia. Some countries (e.g. Morocco) 
recorded asset booms prior to the crisis, with private investment going to non-tradable sectors. Overall, data 
on private savings rates is limited.     8
Increasing domestic savings rates and reducing capital outflows, especially the illicit 
ones, continue to be key policy challenges for this group
7.  On the positive side, policy 
makers are able to impact public saving rates through measures geared towards resource 
mobilization and improved efficiency of government spending. On the other hand, 
private savings rates tend to be persistent, with changes in their determinants exhibiting 
full impact only after a number of years (Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Serven, 2000). 
 
Oil exporters face different challenges. Despite higher savings rates (about 35 percent in 
2005-08), in the last few years prior to the crisis their investment rates were close, and 
private investment rates even below, those of oil importers (Figure 2́). This suggests that 
export proceeds were not used for enhancing productive capacity and competitiveness. 
Export proceeds and the accumulated foreign exchange reserves thus need to be better 
managed to maximize their development impact (Figure AI.3.a, Annex I).  
 
The conduct of monetary policy with fluctuating oil revenues also presents a challenge. 
Specifically, with rising revenues during the commodity boom, oil exporters’ deposit 
bases expanded and growth of credit to the private sector escalated. Subsequently, it 
declined markedly during the global financial crisis when commodity revenues 
plummeted, underscoring the importance of diversification (Figure A.3.b, Annex I)
8.   
 
Figure 2a. Africa and Developing Asia: National Savings and Investment Rates (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Arican Economic Outlook database and IMF WEO database.  
 
                                                 
7 Savings matters for growth and innovation, notably by allowing domestic and foreign investors to engage 
in joint ventures (Aghion, 2009). Elbadawi and Mwega (2000) cover the causes of low savings rates in 
SSA, while Ndikumana and Boyce (2010) discuss capital flight from SSA countries. 
 
8 As the global financial and economic crisis once again illustrated, undiversified, low value-added exports, 
lead to large volatility of proceeds, reiterating that greater diversification is needed both in terms of 
products and trade partners, including deepening South-South and regional trade and investment ties.     9
Figure 2b. African Oil Exporters and Importers: Investment Rates (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Arican Economic Outlook database and IMF WEO database.  
 
African countries in general, and LICs in particular, also face a range of other structural 
constraints that undermine competitiveness, private sector development, and growth. Key 
among these are the infrastructure deficits that raise production and trade costs, rigid 
regulatory frameworks that discourage entrepreneurship, and weak market integration at 
national and sub-regional level that limit the flow of goods and services while also 
limiting the gains from economies of scale. These constraints existed before the crisis and 
they will need to feature centrally in the national strategies aimed at unlocking the 
potential of the private sector and promoting diversification of the economic base as a 
means of laying the foundation for higher, sustained and share growth. 
 
Growth Drivers 
Sources of Aggregate Demand 
Different factors drove aggregate demand across countries. Among the oil exporters, 
frontier markets and transition LICs, demand was driven largely by exports, while in the 
rest of the countries it was domestic demand-driven (Table 1). In the emerging markets, 
private consumption increased markedly during 2001—08, in some cases also in part due 
to the asset boom. The rising share of private investment in GDP in most subgroups 
(except oil exporters) is a positive development since it went mostly into productive 
capital and infrastructure, building a base for future growth
9.   
 
                                                 
9 This approach considers a short-term to medium-term horizon, where consumption (and aggregate 
demand) can stimulate output. Over the longer term, where both consumption and imports are functions of 
output (c = c(y) and z = z(y)), the relative shares of the drivers changes and exports are a key driver of 
growth.   10
Table 1. Changes in Domestic Demand in Africa, 2001- 08, percent of GDP 
   Domestic 
Demand 
Consumption/GDP Investment/GDP 
    Total Private  Public  Total Private  Public 
Africa 2.3 -0.5 -1.2 0.8 2.8  3.6  -0.8
             
Oil exporters  -6.7 -3.4 -3.4 -0.1 -3.3  -4.8  1.5
Emerging markets  8.8 2.3 7.6 -5.3 6.5  5.4  1.1
LICs, frontier markets  -3.2 -4.4 -4.6 0.2 1.1  3.4  -2.3
LICs, transition countries  -0.8 -3.5 -8.4 4.8 2.7  7.9  -5.2
LICs, pre-transition  9.2 1.8 -1.2 3.0 7.4  8.3  -0.9
LICs, fragile 1/  14.4 7.1 2.2 4.9 7.3  9.1  -1.8
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on African Economic Outlook database (un-weighted averages). 1/ If 
Liberia were excluded, demand for this group would be driven mostly by domestic consumption. .  
Rising Private Capital Flows: Magnitudes and Impacts 
 
As many African countries are small open economies with low savings rates and/or 
volatile exports, capital flows – especially private capital flows recently – also fueled 
growth. While developed economies continue to account for the majority of the world 
FDI flows – they are the main source of outward FDI and receive about 70 per cent of the 
total inflows of FDI – and the long-term geographical pattern of the FDI flows has been 
gradually changing towards developing countries including in Africa. 
 
In recent years, the net private capital flows to Africa (FDI) exceeded several times 
official flows. Specifically, after years of relatively slow growth, net private capital 
inflows to African countries accelerated in the early 2000s and surged between 2004 and 
2007, reaching about $30 billion (slightly above 3 % of Africa’s GDP) in 2007, while 
official flows amounted to only $6 billion that year (Figure 3). The surge of private 
capital flows to Africa reflects both increased risk appetite of foreign investors searching 
for new profit opportunities, as well as the success of macroeconomic and structural 
reforms in many African countries
10.  
  
The analysis of the components of private capital flows to North Africa and SSA prior to 
the crisis reveals that in both groups FDI accounted for the lion’s share of the total flows, 
with North Africa having received about 30 percent of total FDI going to the continent. 
However, FDI has been distributed unevenly even within Africa; the top five recipient 
countries received the bulk of FDI inflows to Africa during 2001 – 2008.  Resource rich 
countries and the mineral sectors attracted the main share of these flows, but more 
recently investors have discovered countries other than Angola, Nigeria, and South 
Africa, their traditional preferred destinations. Since mid-2000s, frontier market countries 
such as Ghana, Uganda, and Zambia have attracted increased FDI. As far as non-mining 
sectors, services – especially telecommunications and banking – have been receiving 
disproportionate shares of FDI (Figure A.4). 
                                                 
10 Over the period, private capital flows to Africa and growth in advanced economies are negatively 
correlated, suggesting that the business cycles in advanced economies play a role in the availability of 
capital for the continent. Moreover, the share of Africa’s FDI in the FDI flows to emerging market and 
developing countries remains constant throughout the period, pointing to general increase of investors’ 
interest in developing countries.     11
Figure 3. Net private capital flows to Africa, 1981 – 2008 (in $ billions) 
 
Source: IMF WEO database.  
In addition to the FDI destinations, the sources of FDI have also changed during the past 
two decades, with the rising importance of Southern investors, especially from Asia. At 
the end of 2008, all top five ‘South’ investors in Africa were from Asia: China’s stock of 
FDI in Africa amounted to over $13 billion, followed by Singapore ($9.8 billion), 
Malaysia ($3.7 billion), India ($2.7 billion), and Korea ($0.5 billion) (UNCTAD, 2009). 
At about 5 percent of total FDI inflows, the share of African investment on the continent 
remained almost unchanged and well below that of intra-regional investment in other 
regions. Still, intra-African FDI flows constitute an important source of investment funds 
in several countries, especially in Southern Africa (e.g. Mauritius, Mozambique), with 
South Africa being the main investor (Figure A.4.c). 
 
While often beneficial, the impact of FDI on productivity and growth remains limited in 
most countries. For example, among several West African countries (Cape Verde, Ghana, 
Senegal, Nigeria) and Egypt during 1987 – 2008, FDI generated positive technological 
spillovers only in Cape Verde and Egypt. In Senegal and Ghana, the positive impact on 
FDI on growth occurred through capital accumulation and increased the marginal product 
of capital, while in Nigeria, FDI did not seem to have any significant impact at the 
aggregate level, although some specific sectors may have benefited (Annex  II).  
 
The observation that FDI would be more beneficial for growth in more developed 
economies is consistent with the literature on the need to establish necessary threshold 
conditions for FDI to have a positive impact on growth. Specifically, empirical evidence 
suggests that some minimal threshold of development is needed for the host countries to 
benefit from FDI (Borenzstein et al., 1998; Alfaro et al., 2004; Wang and Wong, 2009). 
Put differently, if the institutional, technological and human capital gaps with the 
investor’s country are wide, the host country will lack capacity to absorb the   12
technological and “know-how’ transfers. Efforts to raise human capital and technological 
capacity are therefore key to reaping development benefits from FDI.  
 
More broadly, the positive impact of FDI on growth and development of host countries is 
unlikely to materialize unless the other participants in this process, e.g. multinational 
enterprises, the sending countries and the international community, implement supporting 
policies. For example, given that trade and FDI reinforce each other and some FDI is 
even contingent on trade, further trade liberalization in sending countries would be FDI-
enhancing. Equally important is that sending companies take into account technological 
priorities of recipient countries, and where feasible ‘clean’ technologies, to facilitate 
sustainable development. As OECD (2002) points out, MNEs have a key role to play by 
utilizing adequate technology, sharing knowledge, and adhering to good standards of 
corporate behavior. 
 
Capital Flows and Savings in Africa: Complements or Substitutes?  
  
While the link between capital flows (foreign savings) and domestic savings has been 
extensively examined for emerging market regions (e.g. Latin America, Asia, and 
emerging Europe), it has been relatively understudied for Africa and especially SSA, 
because of the lower private capital flows that the region has received in the past. With 
increased private inflows, the issue has gained in importance, especially in light of the 
implicit vulnerability to ‘sudden stops’. 
 
The short run responses of saving rates to capital flows in Africa during 1980-2008, 
measured by the pair-wise correlation between their cyclical components are presented in 
Table2.
11 The positive correlation points to complementarity between capital flows and 
savings; when it is negative, they are substitutes. Two observations stand out. First, the 
correlation between domestic saving and capital flows (foreign savings) is negative in 
SSA and positive in North Africa, suggesting that these are substitutes in the former and 
complements in the latter. Second, correlation between cyclical components of capital 
flows to North Africa and SSA was positive, suggesting that common external shocks 
determined capital inflows.  
Together, these observations point to different macroeconomic policy responses to capital 
flows in these sub-regions, with North Africa being able to raise investment rates 
substantially more than SSA during the 2000s, albeit still less than in developing Asia. 
However, this does not imply that SSA has only raised its consumption. Historically 
(from 1965 – 2006), only about 65 percent of increased official capital flows relative to 
output in SSA was used for either consumption (41 percent) or investment (24 percent). 
The remaining portion of increased aid inflows financed outflows such as debt 
repayment, reserve accumulation and capital flight (Serieux, 2009). During 2000s, the 
outflows from SSA amounting to US$358 billion markedly exceeded that from North 
                                                 
11 The approach of Reinhart and Talvi (1998) is adopted. Annual data on savings rates and capital flows 
during 1980 - 2008 are used and decomposed into their trend (permanent) and cyclical (temporary) 
components, using the HP and the band pass filters.  
    13
Africa of US$79 billion (Ker and Cartwright-Smith, 2010). The amount of illicit capital 
outflows from SSA and the acceleration of this trend during 2000s need to be addressed 
(see Ndikumana and Boyce, 2010).  




Band pass filter 
correlation 
Africa -0.141  -0.362* 
SSA -0.444*  -0.59* 
North Africa  0.396*  0.307 
Low incomes countries 2/  -0.362  -0.496* 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the African Development Bank database and the IMF WEO 
database. 1/ * Denotes significance at 10 percent level. 2/ Denoted countries eligible for concessional 
financing from the AfDB.   
3.  Comparing pre-crisis macroeconomic paths of Africa and developing Asia 
In the ongoing development debate, Asia has often been  an example of success that 
Africa could possibly follow, including in the areas of macroeconomic management and 
private sector development. Moreover, the low saving and investment rates, together with 
even more limited access to credit in the aftermath of the crisis, have raised questions 
whether African countries can reach high and sustainable long run growth.
12 It is thus 
worthwhile to examine the key differences in the chosen macroeconomic and 
development paths during 2000s, with a view of identifying elements and policies that 
Africa could apply regardless of these differences.  
Disparities in policies and outcomes among Africa’s subgroups notwithstanding, several 
observations can be made about the development paths undertaken by Africa and 
developing Asia. Asian economies in 2000s were characterized by high domestic 
(national) savings rates, active FDI policy, very low foreign debt, and –as a reaction to 
the Asian crisis – rapidly rising foreign exchange reserves. In contrast, due to limited 
domestic revenue mobilization, African economies exhibited lower savings rates and 
hence smaller room for domestic investment. This, in turn, led to greater dependency on 
foreign capital. Moreover, Asian economies have created a strong capacity to export 
manufacturing goods, which is almost absent in Africa where exports are dominated by 
primary commodities and low value-added products.
13  
More broadly, on the spectrum of possible development paths, during 2000s Africa was 
notably closer than developing Asia to the “Washington Consensus”. This approach 
                                                 
12 According to the Solow growth model, technological progress is the only diver of the long-run growth, 
while investment plays a role only in transition. Since SSA economies are not in the steady state, 
investment rates matter. 
    
13 Regarding similarities, African oil and commodity exporters also accumulated high reserves (albeit lower 
than in Asia) during the commodity boom, underscoring the importance of appropriate management of 
reserves.  
   14
emphasized trade and FDI liberalization, deregulation and privatization, and reducing the 
role of the state in the economy. Much of this choice by African countries was driven by 
the financial arrangements with the IMF and the World Bank and especially by the debt 
relief initiatives. Still, in many ways, the reforms adopted during this period served 
Africa well, as the increased pre-crisis growth and the continent’s resilience during the 
global crisis illustrated. Regarding structural reforms such as improving governance and 
removing barriers to competition, Africa still lags behind other regions, underscoring the 
importance of further reforms.  
An open question also remains whether the objective of macroeconomic stability, in 
particular low inflation, was overemphasized among Africa’s economic policies at the 
expense of measures that stimulate growth and accelerate poverty reduction (as suggested 
above). More recently, policy makers all over the world recognized, and the impact of the 
global financial crisis reinforced, that the state has an important role to play in 
development, beyond creating an enabling environment for businesses and providing 
basic social services. The departure of the prevailing development paradigm from 
excessive emphasis on the market was in part due to the positive role of state 
interventions in growth promotion in Asia. 
 
In sum, even though during the run up to the crisis Africa reached its highest growth rates 
in decades, the rates were still below those recorded by developing Asia. Africa’s growth 
was not only lower, but also more volatile than that of Asia. Where high growth was 
achieved, it often brought about widening inequalities, as many African countries are still 
missing indigenous industries, in particular manufacturing, or highly productive services. 
Correspondingly, political room to pursue social policies, including building adequate 
social safety nets, was also limited. Key factors behind these different development paths 
have been (i) notably lower saving rates in Africa than in Asia, especially among its oil 
importers; and (ii) volatile and low-value added exports of oil exporters. These factors 
contributed to Africa’s dependence on external environment including official aid and 
exports markets, and made the continent vulnerable to external shocks. 
 
III.  Impact of the crisis on Africa and the exit strategies
14 
  
a.  The Africa surprise 
 
Overall impact of the crisis 
 
In 2009, Africa’s high growth was interrupted by a severe external shock in the 
form of the global financial and economic crisis. Most African countries were hit hard 
through the real channels such as declining exports and FDI and in some cases also aid, 
                                                 
14 Parts of this section draw on African Development Bank, UNECA, AUC (2010), ‘Achieving Strong, 
Sustained and Shared Growth in Africa in the Post-crisis Global Economy’, presented at the 2010 
KOAFEC Conference (Seoul, September).  
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remittances and tourism receipts. Subsequently, in 2009 most key macroeconomic 
indicators deteriorated. Real GDP grew on average by only 2.5 percent, but the 
performance varied from 6.8 percent decline (Seychelles) to 9.9 percent growth 
(Ethiopia). The impact on SSA was severe, as growth collapsed from an average of 6.1 
percent during 2001-08 to 1.6 percent in 2009. Since the crisis was an external shock, the 
countries that were more open to trade and grew faster before the crisis experienced 
larger growth falls in 2009. Correspondingly, they are expected to recover the fastest, 
alongside the multispeed global revival (Figure A.I.5, Annex I). Nevertheless, as the 
global recovery remains fragile, there are downside risks to Africa’s outlook. 
Regarding other key macroeconomic indicators, the curtailed demand in the advanced 
economies and lower commodity prices led to a marked deterioration of trade and current 
account balances; oil exporters took a particularly heavy hit. A number of countries 
experienced ‘twin deficits’, as worsening current account balances were accompanied by 
rising fiscal deficits; no marked reversal occurred in 2010 except for oil exporters. In low 
income countries in general and (resource poor) fragile states in particular, the 
deterioration of the current account balances to high levels raises concerns about 
maintaining hard-won debt sustainability over the medium term (Table A.I.1, Annex I).  
Unemployment and working poverty have also escalated due to the crisis.  ILO (2010) 
estimated that the working poverty (people living on less than 1.25 dollar a day) may 
have increased up to 15 percent in 2009  due to the crisis, which would bring the rates 
back to 2003 levels. Unemployment in Africa is also estimated to have increased 
markedly, by about 1 – 4 million people between 2008 and 2009.
15  
Focus on Private Capital Flows 
Given the importance of private capital flows in ‘financing’ Africa’s economies, we 
discuss in some detail their developments during the global financial and economies 
crisis. On the eve of the global financial crisis, most of African economies had only 
limited links with the global financial system. Nevertheless, the substantial inflows in 
2000s made some emerging and frontier market economies more integrated into the 
global financial markets, and more vulnerable to the risks of “sudden stops” and reversals 
of capital flows.
16   
  South Africa experienced “sudden stops” in 2008, when its external equity and 
bond issuance declined from about $20 billion in 2007 to less than $4 billion. Its 
stock market index plummeted in the last quarter of 2008 due to the net outflows 
and large equity price corrections, but has been gradually recovering since the 
second quarter of 2009. 
                                                 
15 Specific examples include the mining sector in Zambia where 28 percent of jobs were lost already in 
2008, while the manufacturing sector in South Africa shrank by about 20 percent in 2009.  
16 According to investment-based indicators, their degree of financial integration was close to that of 
emerging market countries in other regions, such as Latin America, albeit below that of emerging Europe. 
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  In contrast, capital flight from Nigeria led to a plummeting stock market index by 
70 percent between February 2008 and March 2009; the market is yet to recover 
from these shocks. These developments amplified the difficulties of the banking 
sector, which stemmed mostly from poor governance and excessive lending to the 
energy sector.
17 
On balance though, due to low financial depth and under-developed financial systems in 
the low income and fragile countries which account for the bulk of Africa, the continent’s 
overall financial integration is limited. Moreover, since most of the private capital flows 
to Africa took the form of FDI, the continent’s exposure to the global credit crunch was 
less severe.
18 Africa was thus mostly shielded from the direct impact through the 
financial channel when the crisis hit. Moreover, in a number of cases the vulnerability to 
external financial shocks has been reduced due to reforms that strengthened the financial 
sector and macro-prudential indicators, and debt relief received prior to the crisis.
19 The 
policy space to absorb the massive external shock created by the crisis has thus been 
larger than prior to the previous crises.  
 
SSA in particular has been more immune to the impact of the financial crisis than other 
developing and emerging market regions (Figure 4).
20 While FDI flows to Africa 
continue to be small in absolute amounts, when measured in terms of GDP, in 2009 SSA 
received more net FDI inflows than emerging and developing countries on average. 
However, when it comes to official capital inflows to mitigate the crisis, SSA has 
received smaller amounts (even relative to GDP) than other developing regions except 
Asia, which has led the global recovery.
21 The limited availability of the official aid has 
also underscored the importance for African countries to attract adequate private capital 
flows to fuel growth, while managing their volatility.   
 
Counter-cyclical Policies 
Due to the prudent macroeconomic stance and the debt relief prior to the crisis, a number 
of countries have built up sufficient policy space to adopt counter-cyclical measures 
                                                 
17 In August 2009 the Central Bank of Nigeria injected funds equivalent to 2.5 percent of GDP into the 
banking system to raise the capital adequacy of the banks to the regulatory minimum level, when five 
Nigerian banks posted losses from non-performing loans. The management of the banks was replaced.  
 
18 Tong and Wei (2009) showed that the degree of credit crunch experienced by the emerging market and 
developing countries depended in part on the composition of their capital flows. Specifically, countries that 
were more exposed to the non-FDI private flows prior to the crisis also faced more severe credit crunch. 
For African low-income countries, the global credit crunch took mostly the form of limited trade financing.  
 
19 The banking sectors in Africa remain relatively profitable, partly due to restrictions on competition.  
 
20 In 2008 SSA’s non-FDI private financial inflows declined by only about 1 percentage point of GDP from 
the average of 2003-07, while those to the CIS declined by more than 9 percentage points on average.  
 
21  The regions hit the most severely by the crisis in 2009 – the emerging Europe and the CIS – also 
benefited the most from the assistance from the international community. 
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when the crisis hit. Fiscal policies played a key role, for the most part through increased 
government expenditures on infrastructure (e.g., Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania). This policy 
choice is consistent with the need not only to stimulate short run aggregate demand 
through higher outlays, but also to release supply side bottlenecks over the medium term, 
thus laying the foundations for high growth.
22 While countries also adopted an 
accommodative monetary stance, given the structural rigidities and limited links between 
interest rates and credit, monetary policy was much less effective in stimulating growth 
except in a few middle income countries (e.g., South Africa). Even frontier markets in 
East Africa had to rely more on fiscal policy to counter the crisis, with monetary policy 
being less effective (Figure A.I. 6). 
Figure 4. Capital flows before and during the crisis, 2003-07, 2008 and 2009 1/ 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the IMF WEO database. 1/CEE denotes Central and Easter Europe 
and CIS stands for the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
 
The crisis has thus also shown that in Africa cuts in policy rates do not necessarily 
increase credit to the private sector, pointing to structural rigidities and inefficiencies in 
financial systems. With these impediments, the private sector alone will not be able to 
drive Africa’s near-term recovery; continued effective state interventions will be needed. 
 
 
Africa’s Near Term Prospects  
                                                 
22 In Kenya, the government financed infrastructure by issuing local-currency infrastructure bonds. 
Kasekende, Brixiova and Ndikumana (2010) discuss the counter-cyclical policies of African countries 
during the crisis in detail.     18
On balance though, Africa has shown a surprising resilience during this crisis and 
is now staging a robust comeback.  The continent as a whole avoided recession, and 
output in only 10 out of 53 countries contracted in 2009. The growth is expected to reach 
4.5 percent in 2010 and 5.2 in 2011. Except for Madagascar, all African countries are 
projected to record positive growth in 2010 and in 2011. Many, including some fragile 
states, are recovering fast as commodity prices rebound. According to the African 
Development Bank’s projections, in 2011 Africa will be again one of the fastest growing 
world regions (Figure 5). At the same time, the multispeed global recovery still poses 
downside risks to Africa’s outlook, while the potential growth could be permanently 
hampered by the crisis (Brixiova, Kamara and Ndikumana, 2010a).  
Figure 5. Africa and other regions, real GDP growth (2006 – 2011, forecasted), percent 
 
Sources: African Development Bank database and IMF WEO (October 2010).  
Nevertheless, the impact was varied. In some countries (e.g., Swaziland, Cape Verde) the 
crisis has reduced the fiscal policy space by raising the deficit and financing it through 
debt. In others (e.g., Ghana, DRC) inflation accelerated, cutting the room for policies to 
stimulate aggregate demand. Finally, in spite of overall sound levels, in some countries 
(e.g., Chad, Malawi) international reserves declined markedly. For example, Chad’s 
reserves collapsed by almost 50 percent between 2008 and 2009, from 3.8 months of 
imports to about 2 months. Similarly, Malawi’s international reserves declined by 35 
percent and stood at mere 2 weeks of imports in 2009 (down from 1 month in 2008).  
Overall, Africa has weathered the crisis overall well due in part to: (i) cautious 
macroeconomic policies adopted across many countries prior to the crisis; (ii) appropriate 
counter-cyclical measures adopted where feasible; (iii) increased trade and investment 
linkages with Asia (e.g. Angola, Namibia, Gabon, Benin) and other emerging market 
countries; and (iv) in some sub-regions, more intensive regional integration and good 
diversification also helped. 
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Exit strategies from crisis interventions 
 
Despite the positive outlook, uncertainties stemming from a fragile global outlook 
surround also Africa’s recovery. Given that in 2010 (and even 2011) many countries are 
projected to grow below their trend growth, the key policy challenge is to bring them on a 
path of strong, sustained and shared growth, including through demand management 
policies as a response to the crisis. In 2010, this suggestion is in line with the adopted 
policies -- about 40 percent of countries are projected to have higher fiscal deficit in 2010 
than in 2009 (AfDB and OECD, 2010). African governments may want to maintain 
somewhat accommodative policies also in 2011, while gradually refocusing on medium 
term objectives and fiscal consolidation.  Exit strategies from the crisis intervention 
policies should thus be gradual and well coordinated across countries and policies.
23  
Given the case for gradual exits from accommodative policies, the key question is then 
how much policy space, especially on the fiscal and inflation sides, African countries 
have to pursue accommodative stances in 2011. Despite a deterioration in a number of 
countries (Figure A.I.7, Annex I), most African countries have emerged from the crisis 
with stronger fiscal positions than the advanced economies. The countries hit particularly 
hard in 2009 were oil or mineral exporters which are expected to rebound quickly. A few 
exceptions aside, debt sustainability has not been so far a major concern, even though the 
problem may arise over the medium term unless the current stance is reversed. Often, the 
countries underperforming on growth (i.e. growing below their trend growth rates) are 
over-performing on inflation (i.e. with inflation rates either below 5 percent or within 5 -
10 percent, but below their trends) (Figure 6). In these cases, countries should not avoid 
stimulating aggregate demand out of fear of raising slightly inflation; bringing their 
economies on a high growth path is a much more urgent priority. 
In sum, growth should be the key macro priority in the near term for most African 
countries, especially LICs. For those with ‘room to inflate’, inflation is not a priority right 
now as moderate increase can be reversed later, once high growth is restored. Still, with 
deteriorating fiscal and current account deficits, fiscal policy needs to ensure that any 
‘extra’ public expenditures are growth oriented; increasing infrastructure spending can be 
particularly useful for removing supply-side bottlenecks. At the same time, African 
policy makers need to ensure that important social outlays remain protected or even 
scaled up. Building social safety nets is also important so that in the future the most 
vulnerable segments of the population are protected and growth is shared. A positive 
effect of such measures would be also the creation of automatic fiscal stabilizers on the 
expenditure side, now missing in most African countries. 
IV.  Beyond the crisis: pro-growth macroeconomic policies 
With Africa rebounding, the objectives of macroeconomic policy need to gradually shift 
from short-run stabilization policies geared at recovery to stimulating medium-term 
                                                 
23 Brixiova, Kamara, and Ndikumana (2010b) discuss the exit options for African countries.
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growth with job creation.
24 Going forward, rather than overemphasizing price stability, 
macroeconomic policy should aim at supporting strong, sustained and shared growth as a 
way to build prosperity and reduce poverty in Africa’s LICs.  
 
As the crisis demonstrated, countries that had more flexible macroeconomic frameworks 
and built up cushions, especially through fiscal policy space, fared better. The main 
lesson from the crisis is that macroeconomic frameworks need to be more flexible while 
maintaining their credibility. On the fiscal side, LICs would benefit from replacing pro-
cyclical policies of the past (Annex III) with rule-based and counter-cyclical frameworks 
that still leave room for discretion to counter unexpected shocks. In practical terms this 
means building automatic stabilizers on the expenditure side (e.g., social safety nets), 
while strengthening medium-term expenditure frameworks.  
Figure 6. Africa: room to grow and room to inflate, 2010 1/ 


























































Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AfDB database. 1/ Growth gap is the difference between the 
potential growth (average of 2006 – 2008) and the actual growth in 2010. Inflation gap is calculated as the 
difference between the targeted/trend inflation (average of 2001-2008) and the actual inflation in 2010. In 
cases where inflation trend was below 5 percent, target was set as 5. Similarly, where inflation trend was 
above 10 percent, target was set at 10. Positive growth gaps mean that countries should aim at higher 
growth; positive inflation gap means that there may be some room to inflate, especially for low income 
countries with inflation below 5 percent.  
In pro-growth oriented macroeconomic policy, phasing out pro-cyclical fiscal policies 
that prevailed in the run up to the crisis would in particular help achieve sustained growth 
                                                 
24 In particular, going forward policy priorities should not overemphasize very low inflation at the cost of 
growth, as was typically the case before the crisis, particularly in low-income countries. 
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by reducing output volatility.
25 The objective of fiscal policy should thus be balancing 
budgets (net domestic financing) over the cycle. Given the need to raise efficiency of 
public spending and maintain debt sustainability, annual budgets should be anchored in 
medium-term expenditure frameworks. Such frameworks can also play a counter-cyclical 
role. Donors could support such frameworks by giving adequate official aid in a timely 
and predictable manner. Moreover, to avoid pro-cyclical fiscal cuts in downturns, African 
governments need to develop domestic debt markets and improve their access to debt 
financing, as the example of Kenya showed. For frontier market LICs, gaining access to 
international bond markets on more competitive terms is also important.  
 
To reach strong, sustained and shared growth, public expenditures (and official aid) need 
to scale up public investments, whose share in budgets has been declining, in exchange 
for increasing social outlays.  Given the limited domestic resources in a number of 
Africa’s LICs (especially oil importers), the increased deficits will need to rely on either 
official aid or external private financing (e.g., Ghana) or local-currency infrastructure 
bonds (e.g., Kenya). Moreover, it will be important that African policy makers use the 
external sources in such a way that they stimulate domestic resource mobilization. While 
high tax levies surely discourage private investment and entrepreneurship, dynamic 
benefits of public expenditures for growth and development need to be taken into account 
and an optimal balance found (UNCTAD, 2010).  
As the pre-crisis and crisis experience illustrated, monetary policy is not a particularly 
effective tool of macroeconomic management in Africa’s LICs. As the globalized 
economy requires quick responses to shocks, there has been a world-wide trend towards 
more flexibility in monetary and exchange rate regimes, which is likely to continue and 
should be supported.
26 Where conditions allow (in some frontier market LICs), 
consideration could thus be given to introducing flexible inflation targeting (IT) 
frameworks, as was done in South Africa and Ghana.  
Recent global developments also showed once again the negative effects that freezing up 
of credit can have on growth. As the view that in developing countries monetary policy 
affects output mostly through the credit channel has gained acceptance, African central 
bankers have increasingly focused on credit as the key part of the monetary transmission 
mechanism. Hence going forward, a key task of monetary policy in Africa’s LICs would 
be to ensure that sufficient private sector credit is available to fuel private investment and 
growth.
27 At the same time, the role of public investment (especially in infrastructure) as 
                                                 
25 Evidence of procyclical patterns of fiscal policies is in Annex III.  
 
26 In 1970s, 90 percent of all countries had fixed exchange rate regimes; in 2000 less than 30 percent of 
countries.  In Africa, the share of countries with flexible regimes has also increased over time. According to 
the IMF classification, 44 countries out of 192 practiced formal inflation targeting as of April 31, 2008, up 
from 19 countries (among 187) that had this regime in 2003. Some countries target inflation informally. 
 
27 Such monetary policy needs to be accompanied by structural reforms to remove obstacles to obtaining 
credit, to be effective. Many other policies, including industrial policy to stimulate the private sector, 
policies geared towards regional integration and product diversification as well as building of social safety 
nets, are key for strong and shared growth. They are outside of the scope of this paper and are covered 
elsewhere (AfDB, UNECA, AUC, 2010).     22
a driver of growth is key, both through releasing supply side bottlenecks and through 
‘crowding in’ private investment.  
V.  Conclusions 
This paper reviewed macroeconomic policies in Africa prior to the crisis, with a special 
focus on LICs. It pointed out that while many countries, including many LICs, achieved 
very low inflation (below 5 percent a year) and higher growth than in the past, their 
gowth was still not high enough to meaningfully reduce poverty and begin bridging the 
gap in living standards with advanced economies. At the same time, the cushions built up 
prior to the crisis as well as increased trade and investment relations with emerging 
markets helped Africa weather the external shock and stage a relatively fast recovery.  
 
The paper underscores that in the aftermath of the crisis, the emphasis of macroeconomic 
policy needs to shift from the objective of stabilization and achieving low inflation that 
predominated prior to the crisis towards supporting strong, sustained and shared growth. 
To reach this goal, countries would benefit from macroeconomic frameworks (i.e. fiscal, 
monetary and exchange rate regimes) that are more flexible, while maintaining 
credibility. Fiscal policy is key in this regard, through public outlays on infrastructure 
anchored in the medium term expenditure frameworks that also have a counter-cyclical 
role. Where conditions allow, frontier market LICs may want to consider adopting 
flexible inflation targeting frameworks that provide sufficient room for providing credit 
to the private sector. To be effective, efforts in the area of macroeconomic policy would 
need to be accompanied by structural reforms to address supply side bottlenecks. To 
achieve shared growth, African policymaker will need to put even greater emphasis on 
creation of highly productive jobs and building up of formal social safety nets, which are 
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ANNEX I – TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table AI.1a. Selected Macroeconomic Indicators Prior, During and After the Last 2 Crises 1/  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the African Development Bank database. 1/ Un-weighted averages.  
The country grouping is defined in Table AI.1b.  24
Table A.I.1b. Country classification
28  
 
Oil Exporters   
LICs, Frontier 
Markets   LICs, Transition 
Angola    Ghana   Burkina Faso 
Cote d'Ivoire    Kenya   Djibouti 
Cameroon    Mozambique   Ethiopia 
Congo, Rep.    Senegal   Lesotho 
Algeria    Tanzania   Malawi 
Egypt    Uganda   Rwanda 
Gabon    Zambia  
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Equatorial Guinea       
Libya    LICs Fragile States   LICs, Pre-transition
Nigeria    Burundi   Benin 
Sudan   
Central African 
Republic   Gambia 
Chad    Comoros   Madagascar 
Congo, Dem. Rep.    Guinea   Mali 
    Guinea Bissau   Mauritania 
Emerging 
Markets    Liberia   Niger 
Botswana    Sierra Leone   Togo 
Cape Verde       
Mauritius       
Morocco       
Namibia       
Seychelles       
South Africa       
Swaziland       












                                                 
28 Besides oil resources, the main distinguishing criteria for this grouping are (i) income level (GDP per 
capita); growth trends and prospects (e.g. private sector development) and (ii) the level of development of 
financial markets, including access to international capital markets.     25
Table AI.2. Africa and developing Asia: Savings, Investment and Net Capital Flows, 
1991 – 2008
29  
   1991 - 95  1996-2000  2001-05  2006-08  2006 2007  2008 
  % of GDP 
Investment              
     Africa  19.4  19.4  21.8 23.6  21.8  23.9  25.1 
       North Africa  23.4  21.1 26.5  27.6  25.2 28.0  29.4 
       Sub-Saharan Africa  17.3  18.3  19.0  21.5  20.2  21.7  22.7 
    Developing Asia  33.9  31.6  33.6  37.9  37.9  37.8  38.1 
             
  Saving rates 1/              
     Africa  18.0  18.8  22.8 28.2  28.1  27.6  28.9 
       North Africa  24.2  23.4 33.5  40.4  40.6 40.5  40.0 
       Sub-Saharan Africa  14.6  15.8  16.7  21.8  21.8  20.9  22.7 
     Developing Asia  31.9  32.5  36.2  44.2  44.0  44.9  43.8 
              
  CAB/GDP 2/              
     Africa  -1.5  -0.6  1.1  4.6  6.3  3.8  3.8 
       North Africa  0.8  2.3  7.0  12.8  15.4  12.4  10.6 
       Sub-Saharan Africa  -2.7 -2.6  -2.3 0.3  1.7  -0.8  -0.1 
     Developing Asia  -2.0  1.0  2.7  6.3  6.1  7.1  5.7 
              
  ∆R (reserves) 3/               
     Africa  -0.7  -0.6  -2.6 -4.2  -5.0  -4.2  -3.4 
       North Africa  -1.4  -1.0 -4.8  -8.5  -8.9 -9.0  -7.7 
       Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.4  -0.4 -1.2  -2.0  -2.9  -1.8  -1.2 
     Developing Asia  -1.9  -1.2 -5.1  -7.8  -6.8  -10.7  -6.0 
              
  Net capital flows – total              
     Africa  2.2  1.2  1.5  1.4  -1.3  0.4  -0.4 
       North Africa  0.6  -1.3 -2.2  -4.3  -6.5  -3.5  -3.0 
       Sub-Saharan Africa  3.1  2.9  3.6  1.7  1.3  2.6  1.2 
     Developing Asia  4.0  0.3  2.4  1.5  0.7  3.6  0.3 
              
Memorandum items               
              
Private capital flows              
       North Africa  1.3  1.1  1.1  2.4  1.1  2.5  3.6 
       Sub-Saharan Africa  1.0  2.0  1.9  2.9  2.5  3.1  3.2 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the African Development Bank database, the IMF WEO database 
for Asia, and authors’ calculations. 1/ National savings rates. 2/ Includes errors and omissions. 3/ Increase 





                                                 
29 Developing Asia is defined as in the IMF’s 2010 World Economic Outlook.     26
Figure AI.1.a. Inflation and growth in Africa’s LICs, 1990-1999 




















































Figure AI.1.b. Inflation and growth in Africa’s LICs, 2000 - 2008 


























































Source: African Economic Outlook and authors’ calculations.  
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Figure AI.2.b. Africa’s transition countries and fragile states: average and standard 
deviation of inflation 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on African Development Bank database. 
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Figure AI.3.a. Foreign Exchange Reserves (stocks), 1991 – 2009 (% of GDP) 
 
Source:  African Economic Outlook database and authors’ calculations.  
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Figure AI.4.a: South Africa:  FDI Inward stock in 2006, by sector (% of total) 
 
Source: Investment map, UNCTAD & ITC 2010. 
 
Figure AI.4.b. Africa: FDI Inflows to Oil Exporters and Importers, 1990-2008 (million 
of US$) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNCTAD (2009a).  
 

















































Mauritius (left axis, millions of Rand)
Other countries (left axis, millions of Rand)
% of total outward FDI stock (right axis)
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Reserve Bank of South Africa data. 1/ Stock as of December 31.    30
Figure AI.5.a. Fastest growing countries in 2008 declined the most in 2009 1/ 
 



































































































Source: African Economic Outlook and authors’ calculations. 1/ Correlation coefficient -0.489 at 1 percent 
significance level.  
Figure A.I.5.b. Least growing countries in 2009 rebounded the most in 2010 1/ 





































































































Source: African Economic Outlook database and authors’ calculations. 1/ Correlation coefficient -0.762 at 
1 percent significance level 
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Figure A.6.a.  Policy rates and growth of credit to the private sector in Tanzania, 2003 – 
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Figure A.6.b.  Policy rates and growth of credit to the private sector in Uganda, 2003 – 
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ANNEX II – Impact of FDI on productivity in selected countries: an empirical investigation 
In this Annex we empirically investigate the FDI-productivity nexus in selected West 
African countries, using the growth accounting framework. In this framework, FDI 
affects growth and productivity through its effect on total factor productivity (TFP), 
which would result from technology transfer and knowledge diffusion, the increased 
efficiency in management, competition, and better production techniques. It also looks at 
the impact of capital on output (MPK). In the growth accounting approach, output is 
produced according to:  
α α − =
1 K AL Y              
 (1) 
where Y  is output,  A is TFP, L  is labor, K  is capital, and α   ) 1 ( α −  is the share of 
labor (capital) in output. The marginal product of capital becomes:  
α α α
− − = K AL MPKp ) 1 ( ,             
(2) 
that is assuming identical technologies (α  and  A), cross-country differences in marginal 
productivity of capital stem from differences in the level of capital. Countries with same 
levels of capital would differ in their rates of return on capital depending on the level of 
TFP,  A.  
 
Denoting FDI stock as F , the aggregate production function becomes: 
α α − =
1 ) ( K L F A Y            
(3) with  ) (F A reflecting the possibility that FDI influences TFP. Marginal product of FDI 
under this production function becomes: 
p F F MPK K L A K L F A K L A + = − +
− − − α α α α α α α
1 1 ) ( ) 1 ( ,      
 (4)   
where  F A is the effect of FDI on TFP. Where such spillover effect is positive, the ‘social’ 
return on FDI is higher than the private marginal product of capital, 
α α α
− − K AL ) 1 (.  
  The total differentiation of logarithm of (3) yields the following modified growth 









dY F ) 1 ( α α − + + =         
 (5) 
Since from (1), 
Y
K









AF  where dF 
is FDI flow and 
A
Y
AF = λ  is the first term of (4). Denoting λ to be the marginal product 
of TFP due to FDI spillovers,
α α − 1 K L AF ,  equation (5) then takes the following form: 









β α λ + + =            ( 6 )  
 
Annual time-series data for emerging and frontier markets in West Africa (Cape Verde, 
Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal) in 1987 – 2008 are used and results compared with those 
for Egypt. The data for FDI, GDP (in 2000 constant prices), and investment (in 2000 
constant prices) in these countries were obtained from the African Development database. 
The employment data are taken from the ILO database. The ordinary least squares (OLS) 
method is used to estimate the relationship between FDI and economic growth (Table 
AII.1). Estimations were carried out with Minitab (version 15) and Stata (version 10). 
 
Table AII.1 presents several insights about the impact of FDI on growth and channels of 
transmission in these countries.
30 Specifically, regarding the impact of FDI on growth 
through positive spillovers (TFP), Table AII.1  shows that among the four West African 
countries studied (Cape Verde, Ghana, Senegal, and Nigeria), λ  is positive and 
statistically significant only for Cape Verde and Egypt. It implies that a 1% increase in 
FDI investment increases the Cape Verde’s growth rate by about 0.31 % and Egypt’s 
growth by 0.4%, through increasing TFP. In Senegal and Ghana, the positive impact on 
FDI occurs through the increased the marginal product of capital. In Nigeria, FDI does 
not have any significant impact at the aggregate level. 
 
Table AII.1. Regression Results (Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Real GDP) 
 
 
  I/GDP  FDI/GDP  ∆L/L  Adjusted R² 
Cape Verde  0.0231 (0.17) 0.3048* (1.99) -2.553 (-0.99) 0.052 
Ghana  0.0869* (2.29) -0.1292  (-0.77) -0.0230 (-0.12)       0.157 
Nigeria  0.4671 (1.48) -0.2458 (-0.48) 21.44 (1.41) 0.058 
Senegal 1/  0.1659** (1.91) 0.7736 (1.67) -5.987 (-1.45) 0.318 
Sierra Leone  0.0263 (0.04) 0.1599 (0.33) 4.697 *(3.06) 0.295 
Egypt   0.01162  (0.16) 0.4003* (2.71) 0.1862 (0.67) 0.212 
Source: Authors’ calculations. * Denotes significance at 5%; ** significance at 10%. 1/ Data are for 1988 
– 2008 
                                                 
30 The growth accounting equation has a particularly limited explanatory power for variations of growth 
rates in Nigeria and Cape Verde. In Nigeria, the economic performance is large driven by fluctuations in oil 
prices, while Cape Verde is heavily dependent on remittances which accounted for about 20 percent of 
GDP in 2000s.  
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As the next step, the aggregate incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) and the social 
marginal product of capital are derived (Table AII.2).
31 Comparing the private marginal 
product of capital (MPK) and the social marginal product of capital (SMPK) reveals that 
in all countries except Nigeria the social return on capital is above the private one, albeit 
slightly. Investment in Nigeria is thus more rewarding to the private investors than to the 
society at large. This can be in part explained by the fact that most investment in Nigeria 
goes to the oil sector, and hence positive externalities are more challenging to generate. 
This sector’s influence on economic performance is constrained weak institutions and 
lack of capacity to maximize resource rents.  
 
Table AII.2. ICOR and Marginal Product of Capital (MPK), average for 1987 - 2008 
 
  Cape Verde Ghana Nigeria Senegal
 
Egypt 
ICOR  7.34 4.98 2.64 4.72 8.2 
SMPK  (soc.)  0.14 0.20 0.38 0.21 0.12 
MPK (priv.)  0.02 0.09 0.47 0.19 0.01 
Difference  0.11 0.11 -0.09 0.03 0.11 





























                                                 
31 The social marginal product of capital captures the impact of all factors on the productivity of capital. In 
contrast, private marginal return to capital reflects only the impact of FDI. 
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ANNEX III -- FISCAL POLICY CYCLES IN AFRICA DURING 1980 – 2007 
 
In this Annex, the cyclical properties of fiscal policy are evaluated through the co-
movement of the cyclical component of the real output (obtained through HP and/or band 
pass filters) and (i) real government consumption; (ii) real government revenues; (iii) real 
private consumption (as indication of tax base); (iii) inflation tax rates.  
Conceptually, the cyclical stance of fiscal policy is measured by policy instruments, 
rather than outcomes, as in Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004). One of the key 
instruments is government consumption (which excludes transfers and debt service 
outlays) on the expenditure side, and tax rates on the revenue side.
32 However, since 
reliable information on tax rates in developing countries, including in Africa, is sparse, 
this note relies on inflation tax rate instead for measuring tax rates and on real private 
consumption for measuring the tax base. 
The sample period is from 1980 to 2007. The main sources used are the annual data from 
the African Development Bank and the IMF’s World Economic Outlook databases.  
Results 
First the cyclical co-movement of the aggregate series for the entire Africa’s real GDP 
and real government consumption during 1980 – 2007 is examined (Table AIII.1). To 
ensure that the results are not affected by the increased capital inflows that Africa has 
experienced since mid-1990s, the sample is split into two sub-periods: (1980-1994 and 
1995 – 2007). Expenditure polices were indeed pro-cyclical in both periods. However, 
differences emerge between sub-groups, with SSA and oil importers having more pro-
cyclical patterns of spending than the other groups (Table AIII.2).  
Table AIII.1. Africa: Correlation between real government consumption and real GDP 1/ 
  HP filter 
Aggregate, 1980 - 2007  0.443* 
Aggregate, 1980 - 1994  0.366 
Aggregate, 1995 - 2007  0.524* 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AfDB database.  1/ Correlation between the cyclical component 
of real GDP and real government spending; through HP filter. * Denotes significance at 10%. 
To find out whether the actual revenue (tax) policies were procyclical, the revenues (TR) 
need to be decomposed into tax rates τ and the tax base (TB):  TB TR . τ = . In that context, 
Table AIII.3 shows that the tax base, approximated by real private consumption, was also 
highly pro-cyclical during 1980 – 2007. 
Table AIII.2. Correlation between real government consumption and GDP by sub-
groups 1/  
                                                 
32 Even though widely used, the fiscal deficit may not provide a clear indication of the cyclical stance of 
fiscal policy, because of the endogeneity of tax revenues. Structural balance, in turn, may contain 
temporary revenue increases due to asset price booms, privatization, official aid, etc.  
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   1980 - 2007  1980-1994  1995 - 2007 
By regions      
  North Africa  0.116  -0.104  0.310 
  Sub-Saharan Africa  0.437*  0.380  0.496* 
      
By resource endowments       
  Net oil exporters  0.264  0.138  0.379 
  Net oil importers  0.581*  0.316  0.809* 
Source: African Economic Outlook database and authors’ calculations.  1/ Correlation between the cyclical 
component of real GDP and real government spending. * indicates significance at 10%. 
Table AIII.3. Africa: Correlation between real government revenues, private 
consumption and GDP 1/ 
   1980-2007  1980-1994  1995-2007 
Real government revenues  0.700*  0.821*  0.623* 
Private consumption  0.723*  0.864*  0.651* 
Inflation tax rate 2/   -0.208  -0.321   -0.086  
Source: African Economic Outlook database and authors’ calculations.  1/ * indicates significance at 10%. 
2/ Correlation between cyclical components. For inflation tax rates, a negative number indicates pro-
cyclicality.   
Moreover, Africa’s fiscal stance was more pro-cyclical in good than in bad times (Table 
AIII.4). Applying the political economy interpretation of Talvi and Vegh (2005), this 
suggests that political pressures to spend during good times are stronger than constraining 
factors in bad times. Exceptions to the observation of generally more procyclical policies 
in good than bad times are WAEMU and oil exporters. 
Table AIII.4. Correlations of government consumption cycles in good and bad times 
   Good times  Bad times 
Africa 0.342  0.174 
    
By regions    
  North Africa  -0.148  0.517* 
  Sub-Saharan Africa  0.706*  -0.076 
    
By regional agreements    
  EAC  0.425  -0.429* 
  SADC  0.758*  -0.329 
  WAEMU  -0.014  0.112 
  WAMZ  0.253  -0.403 
    
By resource endowments     
  Net oil exporters (AFR)  -0.189  0.309 
  Net oil importers (AFR)  0.784*  0.002 
 
Source: African Economic Outlook database and authors’ calculations.  1/ Correlation between the cyclical 
component of real GDP and real government spending obtained through HP filter. * indicates significance 
at 10%.   37
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